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Abstract
We propose ARIANN, a low-interaction framework to perform private training
and inference of standard deep neural networks on sensitive data. This framework
implements semi-honest 2-party computation and leverages function secret sharing,
a recent cryptographic protocol that only uses lightweight primitives to achieve an
efficient online phase with a single message of the size of the inputs, for operations
like comparison and multiplication which are building blocks of neural networks.
Built on top of PyTorch, it offers a wide range of functions including ReLU,
MaxPool and BatchNorm, and allows to use models like AlexNet or ResNet18. We
report experimental results for inference and training over distant servers. Last, we
propose an extension to support n-party private federated learning.
1 Introduction
The massive improvements of cryptography techniques for secure computation over sensitive data
[15, 13, 28] have spurred the development of the field of privacy-preserving machine learning [45, 1].
Privacy-preserving techniques have become practical for concrete use cases, thus encouraging public
authorities to use them to protect citizens’ data, for example in covid-19 apps [27, 17, 38, 39].
However, tools are lacking to provide end-to-end solutions for institutions that have little expertise in
cryptography while facing critical data privacy challenges. A striking example is hospitals which
handle large amounts of data while having relatively constrained technical teams. Secure multi-
party computation (SMPC) is a promising technique that can efficiently be integrated into machine
learning workflows to ensure data and model privacy, while allowing multiple parties or institutions
to participate in a joint project. In particular, SMPC provides intrinsic shared governance: because
data are shared, none of the parties can decide alone to reconstruct it. This is particularly suited for
collaborations between institutions willing to share ownership on a trained model.
Use case. The main use case driving our work is the collaboration between healthcare institutions
such as hospitals or clinical research laboratories. Such collaboration involves a model owner and
possibly several data owners like hospitals. As the model can be a sensitive asset (in terms of
intellectual property, strategic asset or regulatory and privacy issues), standard federated learning
[29, 7] that does not protect against model theft or model retro-engineering [24, 18] is not suitable.
Based on this use case, we will make the following assumptions: first, the parties involved in the
computation are in the Wide Area Network (WAN) setting: they are located typically in different
countries, are well connected and can communicate large amounts of information over the network
with a reasonable latency. They also have access to relatively limited computing power compared
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to data centers, but are likely to remain online for long periods of time. Last, parties are honest-
but-curious, [20, Chapter 7.2.2] and care about their reputation. Hence, they have little incentive to
deviate from the original protocol, but they will use any information available in their own interest.
Contributions. By leveraging function secret sharing (FSS) [9, 10], we propose the first low-
interaction framework for private deep learning which drastically reduces communication to a single
round for basic machine learning operations, and achieves the first private evaluation benchmark on
ResNet18.
• We build on existing work on function secret sharing to design compact and efficient algorithms
for comparison and multiplication, which are building blocks of neural networks. They are
highly modular and can be assembled to build complex workflows.
• We show how these blocks can be used in machine learning to implement operations for secure
evaluation and training of arbitrary models on private data, including MaxPool and BatchNorm.
We achieve single round communication for comparison, convolutional or linear layers.
• Last, we provide an implementation1 and demonstrate its practicality both in LAN (local area
network) and WAN settings by running secure training and inference on CIFAR-10 and Tiny
Imagenet with models such as AlexNet [31] and ResNet18 [22].
Related work. Related work in privacy-preserving machine learning encompasses SMPC and
homomorphic encryption (HE) techniques.
HE only needs a single round of interaction but does not support efficiently non-linearities. For
example, nGraph-HE [5] and its extensions [4] build on the SEAL library [44] and provide a
framework for secure evaluation that greatly improves on the CryptoNet seminal work [19], but it
resorts to polynomials (like the square) for activation functions.
SMPC frameworks usually provide faster implementations using lightweight cryptography. MiniONN
and DeepSecure [34, 41] use optimized garbled circuits [50] that allow very few communication
rounds, but they do not support training and alter the neural network structure to speed up execution.
Other frameworks such as ShareMind [6], SecureML [36], SecureNN [47] or more recently FALCON
[48] rely on additive secret sharing and allow secure model evaluation and training. They use simpler
and more efficient primitives, but require a large number of rounds of communication, such as 11
in [47] or 5 + log2(l) in [48] (typically 10 with l = 32) for ReLU. ABY [16], Chameleon [40] and
more recently ABY3 [35] mix garbled circuits, additive or binary secret sharing based on what is
most efficient for the operations considered. However, conversion between those can be expensive
and they do not support training except ABY3. Last, works like Gazelle [26] combine HE and SMPC
to make the most of both, but conversion can also be costly.
Works on trusted execution environment are left out of the scope of this article as they require access
to dedicated hardware [25]. Data owners which cannot afford these secure enclaves might be reluctant
to use a cloud service and to send their data.
2 Background
Notations. All values are encoded on n bits and live in Z2n . The notation [[x]] denotes 2-party
additive secret sharing of x, i.e., [[x]] = ([[x]]0, [[x]]1) where the shares [[x]]j are random in Z2n , are
held by distinct parties and verify x = [[x]]0 + [[x]]1 mod 2n. In return, x[i] refers to the i-th bit of x.
Function secret sharing. Unlike classical data secret sharing, where a shared input [[x]] is applied on
a public f , function secret sharing applies a public input x on a private shared function [[f ]]. Shares
or keys ([[f ]]0, [[f ]]1) of a function f satisfy f(x) = [[f ]]0(x) + [[f ]]1(x) mod 2n. Both approaches
output a secret shared result.
Let us take an example: say Alice and Bob respectively have shares [[y]]0 and [[y]]1 of a private input
y, and they want to compute [[y ≥ 0]]. While y ∈ Z2n , we can associate it to an n-bit signed integer
in [−2n−1, 2n−1 − 1], where the most significant bit (MSB) is a sign bit. They first mask their shares
using a random mask [[α]], by computing [[y]]0 + [[α]]0 and [[y]]1 + [[α]]1, and then reveal these values
to reconstruct x = y + α. Next, they apply this public x on their function shares [[fα]]j of fα : x→
(x ≥ α), to obtain a shared output ([[fα]]0(x), [[fα]]1(x)) = [[fα(y+α)]] = [[(y+α) ≥ α]] = [[y ≥ 0]].
1All code and implementations will be made available on GitHub.
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[9, 10] have shown the existence of such function shares for comparison which perfectly hide y and
the result. From on now, to be consistent with the existing literature, we will denote the function keys
(k0, k1) := ([[f ]]0, [[f ]]1).
Note that for a perfect comparison, y + α should not wrap around and become negative. Because y
is in practice small compared to the n-bit encoding amplitude, the failure rate is less than one
comparison in a million, as detailed in Appendix C.1.
Security model. We consider security against honest-but-curious adversaries, i.e., parties following
the protocol but trying to infer as much information as possible about others’ input or function
share. This is a standard security model in many SMPC frameworks [6, 3, 40, 47] and is aligned
with our main use case: parties that would not follow the protocol would face major backlash for
their reputation if they got caught. The security of our protocols relies on indistinguishability of the
function shares, which informally means that the shares received by each party are computationally
indistinguishable from random strings. A formal definition of the security is given in [10].
About malicious adversaries, i.e., parties who would not follow the protocol, as all the data available
are random, they cannot get any information about the inputs of the other parties, including the param-
eters of the evaluated functions, unless the parties reconstruct some shared values. The later and the
fewer values are reconstructed, the better it is. As mentioned by [11], our protocols could be extended
to guarantee security with abort against malicious adversaries using MAC authentication [15], which
means that the protocol would abort if parties deviated from it.
3 Function Secret Sharing Primitives
Our algorithms for private equality and comparison are built on top of the work of [10], so the security
assumptions are the same as in this article. However, our protocols achieve higher efficiency by
specializing on the operations needed for neural network evaluation or training.
3.1 Equality test
We start by describing private equality which is slightly simpler and gives useful hints about how
comparison works. The equality test consists in comparing a public input x to a private value α.
Evaluating the input using the function keys can be viewed as walking a binary tree of depth n,
where n is the number of bits of the input (typically 32). Among all the possible paths, the path from
the root down to α is called the special path. Figure 1 illustrates this tree and provides a compact
representation which is used by our protocol, where we do not detail branches for which all leaves
are 0. Evaluation goes as follows: two evaluators are each given a function key which includes a
distinct initial random state (s, t) ∈ {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}. Each evaluator starts from the root, at each
step i goes down one node in the tree and updates his state depending on the bit x[i] using a common
correction word CW (i) ∈ {0, 1}2(λ+1) from the function key. At the end of the computation, each
evaluation outputs t. As long as x[i] = α[i], the evaluators stay on the special path and because the
input x is public and common, they both follow the same path. If a bit x[i] 6= α[i] is met, they leave
the special path and should output 0 ; else, they stay on it all the way down, which means that x = α
and they should output 1.
The main idea is that while they are on the special path, evaluators should have states (s0, t0) and
(s1, t1) respectively, such that s0 and s1 are i.i.d. and t0 ⊕ t1 = 1. When they leave it, the correction
word should act to have s0 = s1 but still indistinguishable from random and t0 = t1, which ensures
t0⊕ t1 = 0. Each evaluator should output its tj and the result will be given by t0⊕ t1. The formal de-
scription of the protocol is given below and is composed of two parts: first, in Algorithm 1, the KeyGen
algorithm consists of a preprocessing step to generate the functions keys, and then, in Algorithm 2,
Eval is run by two evaluators to perform the equality test. It takes as input the private share held by
each evaluator and the function key that they have received. They use G : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}2(λ+1), a
pseudorandom generator, where the output set is {0, 1}λ+1×{0, 1}λ+1, and operations modulo 2n
implicitly convert back and forth n-bit strings into integers.
Intuitively, the correction words CW (i) are built from the expected state of each evaluator on the
special path, i.e., the state that each should have at each node i if it is on the special path given
some initial state. During evaluation, a correction word is applied by an evaluator only when it
has t = 1. Hence, on the special path, the correction is applied only by one evaluator at each bit.
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Figure 1: (left) Binary decision tree with the special path for n = 3. Given an input x = (x1...xn)2,
at each level i, one should take the path labeled by the value in the square equal to the bit value xi.
(right) Flat representation of the tree.
Initialisation: Sample random α $← Z2n
Sample random s(1)j
$← {0, 1}λ and set t(1)j ← j, for j = 0, 1
1 for i = 1..n do
2 (sLj || tLj , sRj || tRj )← G(s(i)j ) ∈ {0, 1}λ+1 × {0, 1}λ+1, for j = 0, 1
3 if α[i] then cw(i) ← (0λ || 0, sL0 ⊕ sL1 || 1)
4 else cw(i) ← (sR0 ⊕ sR1 || 1, 0λ || 0);
5 CW (i) ← cw(i) ⊕G(s(i)0 )⊕G(s(i)1 ) ∈ {0, 1}λ+1 × {0, 1}λ+1
6 statej ← G(s(i)j )⊕ (t(i)j · CW (i)) = (statej,0, statej,1), for j = 0, 1
7 Parse s(i+1)j || t(i+1)j = statej,α[i] ∈ {0, 1}λ+1, for j = 0, 1
8 CW (n+1) ← (−1)t(n+1)1 ·
(
1− s(n+1)0 + s(n+1)1
)
mod 2n
9 return kj ← [[α]]j || s(1)j || CW (1) || · · · || CW (n+1), for j = 0, 1
Algorithm 1: KeyGen: key generation for equality to α
If at step i, the evaluator stays on the special path, the correction word compensates the current
states of both evaluators by xor-ing them with themselves and re-introduces a pseudorandom value s
(either sR0 ⊕ sR1 or sL0 ⊕ sL1), which means the xor of their states is now (s, 1) but those states are still
indistinguishable from random. On the other hand, if x[i] 6= α[i], the new state takes the other half of
the correction word, so that the xor of the two evaluators states is (0, 0). From there, they have the
same states and both have either t = 0 or t = 1. They will continue to apply the same corrections at
each step and their states will remain the same with t0 ⊕ t1 = 0. A final computation is performed to
obtain shared [[T ]] modulo 2n of the result bit t = t0 ⊕ t1 ∈ {0, 1} shared modulo 2.
From the privacy point of view, when the seed s is (truly) random, G(s) also looks like a random
bit-string (this is a pseudorandom bit-string). Each half is used either in the cw or in the next state,
but not both. Therefore, the correction words CW (i) do not contain information about the expected
states and for j = 0, 1, the output kj is independently uniformly distributed with respect to α and
Input: (j, kj , [[y]]j) where j ∈ {0, 1} refers to the evaluator id
1 Parse kj as [[α]]j || s(1) || CW (1) || · · · || CW (n+1)
2 Publish [[α]]j + [[y]]j mod 2n and get revealed x = α+ y mod 2n
3 Let t(1) ← j
4 for i = 1..n do
5 state← G(s(i))⊕ (t(i) · CW (i)) = (state0, state1)
6 Parse s(i+1) || t(i+1) = statex[i]
7 return [[T ]]j ← (−1)j ·
(
t(n+1) · CW (n+1) + s(n+1)) mod 2n
Algorithm 2: Eval: evaluation of the function key for zero test y = 0
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s
(1)
1−j , in a computational way. As a consequence, at the end of the evaluation, for j = 0, 1, Tj also
follows a distribution independent of α. Until the shared values are reconstructed, even a malicious
adversary cannot learn anything about α nor the inputs of the other player.
Function keys should be sent to the evaluators in advance, which requires one extra communication
of the size of the keys. We use the trick of [10] to reduce the size of each correction word in the
keys, from 2(1 + λ) to (2 + λ) by reusing the pseudo-random λ-bit string dedicated to the state used
when leaving the special path for the state used for staying onto it, since for the latter state the only
constraint is the pseudo-randomness of the bitstring.
3.2 Comparison
Our major contribution to the function secret sharing scheme is regarding comparison (which allows
to tackle non-polynomial activation functions for neural networks): we build on the idea of the
equality test to provide a synthetic and efficient protocol whose structure is very close from the
previous one.
Figure 2: (Left) Binary decision tree with all the paths corresponding to x ≤ α for n=3. (Right) Flat
representation of the tree.
Instead of seeing the special path as a simple path, it can be seen as a frontier for the zone in the tree
where x ≤ α. To evaluate x ≤ α, we could evaluate all the paths on the left of the special path and
then sum up the results, but this is highly inefficient as it requires exponentially many evaluations.
Our key idea here is to evaluate all these paths at the same time, noting that each time one leaves the
special path, it either falls on the left side (i.e., x < α) or on the right side (i.e., x > α). Hence, we
only need to add an extra step at each node of the evaluation, where depending on the bit value x[i],
we output a leaf label which is 1 only if x[i] < α[i] and all previous bits are identical. Only one label
between the final label (which corresponds to x = α) and the leaf labels can be equal to one, because
only a single path can be taken. Therefore, evaluators will return the sum of all the labels to get the
final output.
The full description of the comparison protocol is detailed in Appendix A, together with a detailed
explanation of how it works.
4 Application to Deep Learning
We now apply these primitives to a private deep learning setup in which a model owner interacts with
a data owner. The data and the model parameters are sensitive and are secret shared to be kept private.
The shape of the input and the architecture of the model are however public, which is a standard
assumption in secure deep learning [34, 36].
4.1 Additive sharing workflow
All our operations are modular and follow this additive sharing workflow: inputs are provided secret
shared and are masked with random values before being revealed. This disclosed value is then
consumed with preprocessed function keys to produce a secret shared output. Each operation is
independent of all surrounding operations, which is known as circuit-independent preprocessing [11]
and implies that key generation can be fully outsourced without having to know the model architecture.
This results in a fast runtime execution with a very efficient online communication, with a single
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round of communication and a message size equal to the input size for comparison. Preprocessing is
performed by a trusted third party to build the function keys. This is a valid assumption in our use
case as such third party would typically be an institution concerned about its image, and it is very
easy to check that preprocessed material is correct using a cut-and-choose technique [51].
4.2 Machine Learning operations
Matrix Multiplication (MatMul). As mentioned by [11], multiplication fit in this additive sharing
workflow. We use Beaver triples [2] to compute [[z]] = [[x · y]] from [[x]], [[y]] and using a triple
([[a]], [[b]], [[c]] := [[a · b]]), where all values are secret shared in Z2n . The mask is here [[(−a,−b)]] and
is used to reveal (δ, ) := (x− a, y − b). The functional keys are the shares of ([[a]], [[b]], [[c]]) and
are used to compute δ · [[b]] +  · [[a]] + δ · + [[c]] = [[z]]. Matrix multiplication is identical but uses
matrix Beaver triples [14].
ReLU activation function is supported as a direct application of our comparison protocol, which we
combine with a point wise multiplication.
Convolution can be computed as a single matrix multiplication using an unrolling technique as
described in [12] and illustrated in Figure 3 in Appendix C.2.
Argmax operator used in classification to determine the predicted label can also be computed
in a constant number of rounds using pairwise comparisons as shown by [21]. The main idea
here is, given a vector (x0, . . . , xm−1), to compute the matrix M ∈ Rm−1×m where each row
Mi = (xi+1 mod m, . . . , xi+m+1 mod m). Then, each element of column j is compared to xj ,
which requires m(m− 1) parallel comparisons. A column j where all elements are lower than xj
indicates that j is a valid result for the argmax.
MaxPool can be implemented by combining these two methods: the matrix is first unrolled like in
Figure 3 and the maximum of each row in then computed using parallel pairwise comparisons. More
details and an optimization when the kernel size k equals 2 are given in Appendix C.3.
BatchNorm is implemented using a approximate division with Newton’s method as in [48]: given an
input ~x = (x0, . . . , xm−1) with mean µ and variance σ2, we return γ · θˆ · (~x− µ) + β. Variables γ
and β are learnable parameters and θˆ is the estimate inverse of
√
σ2 +  with  1 and is computed
iteratively using: θi+1 = θi · (3− (σ2 + ) · θ2i )/2. More details can be found in Appendix C.4.
More generally, for more complex activation functions such as softmax, we can use polynomial
approximations methods, which achieve acceptable accuracy despite involving a higher number of
rounds [37, 23, 21]. Table 1 summarizes the online communication cost of each operation, and shows
that basic operations such as comparison have a very efficient online communication. We also report
results from [48] which achieve good experimental performance.
4.3 Training phase using Autograd
These operations are sufficient to evaluate real world models in a fully private way. To also support
private training of these models, we need to perform a private backward pass. As we overload opera-
tions such as convolutions or activation functions, we cannot use the built-in autograd functionality
of PyTorch. Therefore, we have developed a custom autograd functionality, where we specify how to
compute the derivatives of the operations that we have overloaded. Backpropagation also uses the
same basic blocks than those used in the forward pass.
5 Extension to Private Federated Learning
This 2-party protocol between a model owner and a data owner can be extended to an n-party
federated learning protocol where several clients contribute their data to a model owned by an
orchestrator server. This approach is inspired by secure aggregation [8] but we do not consider here
clients being phones which means we are less concerned with parties dropping before the end of the
protocol. In addition, we do not reveal the updated model at each aggregation or at any stage, hence
providing better privacy than secure aggregation.
At the beginning of the interaction, the server and model owner initializes its model and builds n pairs
of additive shares of the model parameters. For each pair i, it keeps one of the shares and sends the
6
Table 1: Theoretical online communication complexity of our protocols. Input sizes into bracket are
those of the layers’ parameters, where k stands for the kernel size and s for the stride. Communication
is given in number of values transmitted, and should be multiplied by their size (typically 4 bytes).
Protocol Input size Rounds Communication
Ours [48] Ours [48]
Equality m 1 - m -
Comparison m 1 7 m 2m
MatMul m1 ×m2,m2 ×m3 1 1 m1m2 +m2m3 m1m3
Linear m1 ×m2, {m2 ×m3} 1 1 m1m2 +m2m3 m1m3
Convolution m×m, {k, s} 1 1 ((m− k)/s+ 1)2k2 + k2 ∼ m2k2
ReLU m 2 10 3m 4m
Argmax m 2 - m2 -
MaxPool m×m, {k, s} 3 12(k2 − 1) ((m− k)/s+ 1)2(k4 + 2) ∼ 5m2
BatchNorm m×m 9 335 18m2 ∼ 56m2
Table 2: Inference time over several popular network architectures.
Model Dataset LAN Time (s) WAN Time (s) Online Comm. (MB) Batch Size
Network-1 MNIST 0.004 0.055 0.013 128
Network-2 MNIST 0.096 0.234 0.33 128
LeNet MNIST 0.129 0.289 0.46 128
AlexNet CIFAR-10 0.303 0.696 1.46 128
AlexNet 64×64 ImageNet 0.723 1.36 2.56 128
VGG16 CIFAR-10 4.50 8.14 16.1 32
VGG16 64×64 ImageNet 11.4 35.9 102 16
ResNet18 224×224 ImageNet 43.3 80.8 220 4
other one to the corresponding client i. Then, the server runs in parallel the training procedure with
all the clients until the aggregation phase starts. Aggregation for the server shares is straightforward,
as the n shares it holds can be simply locally averaged. But the clients have to average their shares
together to get a client share of the aggregated model. One possibility is that clients broadcast their
shares and compute the average locally. However, to prevent a client colluding with the server from
reconstructing the model contributed by a given client, they hide their shares using masking. This
can be done using correlated random masks: client i generates a seed, sends it to client i+ 1 while
receiving one from client i− 1. Client i then generates a random mask Mi using its seed and another
Mi−1 using the one of client i− 1 and publishes its share masked with Mi −Mi−1. As the masks
cancel each other out, the computation will be correct.
6 Experiments
We follow a setup very close to [48] and assess inference and training performance of several
networks on the datasets MNIST [33], CIFAR-10 [30], 64×64 Tiny Imagenet and 224×224 Tiny
ImageNet [49, 42], presented in Appendix D.1. More precisely, we assess 5 networks as in [48]: a
fully-connected network (Network-1), a small convolutional network with maxpool (Network-2),
LeNet [32], AlexNet [31] and VGG16 [46]. Furthermore, we also include ResNet18 [22] which to
the best of our knowledge has never been studied before in private deep learning. The description of
these networks is taken verbatim from [48] and is available in Appendix D.2.
Our implementation is written in Python. To use our protocols that only work in finite groups like
Z232 , we convert our input values and model parameters to fixed precision. To do so, we rely on
the PySyft library [43] which extends common deep learning frameworks including PyTorch with a
communication layer for federated learning and supports fixed precision. The experiments are run on
Amazon EC2 m5d.4xlarge machines with 16 cores and 64GB of RAM, and we report our results
both in the LAN and in the WAN setting. Latency is of 70ms for the WAN setting and is considered
negligible in the LAN setting. Last, all values are encoded on 32 bits.
Evaluation inference time. Comparison of experimental runtimes should be taken with caution,
as different implementations and hardware may result in significant differences even for the same
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Table 3: Accuracy of network architectures trained in plain text, tested in the private setting.
Model Dataset Private Accuracy Normal Accuracy
Network-1 MNIST 98.1 98.1
Network-2 MNIST 99.0 99.0
LeNet MNIST 99.4 99.4
AlexNet CIFAR-10 60.6 60.7
AlexNet 64×64 Tiny ImageNet 33.3 33.7
VGG16 CIFAR-10 88.8 88.8
VGG16 64×64 Tiny ImageNet 41.1 41.3
Table 4: Training time and accuracy for networks privately trained from scratch (except AlexNet).
Model Dataset LAN Time (h) Accuracy Nb of epochs
Network-1 MNIST 5.46 97.8 15
Network-2 MNIST 82 87.3 12
LeNet MNIST 51 96.6 6
AlexNet CIFAR-10 58 62.3 4
protocol. However, our inference runtimes reported in Table 2 compare favourably with existing
work including [34–36, 47, 48], in the LAN setting and particularly in the WAN setting thanks to our
reduced number of communication rounds. For example, our implementation of Network-1 is 2×
faster than the best previous result by [35] in the LAN setting and 18× faster in the WAN setting
compared to [48]. For bigger networks such as AlexNet on CIFAR-10, we are still 13× faster in
the WAN setting than [48]. Results are given for a batched evaluation, which allows parallelism
and hence faster execution as in [48]. For larger networks, we reduce the batch size to have the
preprocessing material (including the function keys) fitting into RAM.
Test accuracy. Thanks to the flexibility of our framework, we can train each of these networks in
plain text and need only one line of code to turn them into private networks, where all parameters
are secret shared. We compare these private networks to their plaintext counterparts and observe
that the accuracy is well preserved as shown in Table 3. If we degrade the encoding precision,
which by default considers values in Z232 , and the fixed precision which is by default of 3 decimals,
performance degrades as shown in Appendix B.
Training. We can either train from scratch those networks or fine tune pre-trained models. Training
is an end-to-end private procedure, which means the loss and the gradients are never accessible in
plain text. We use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) which is a simple but popular optimizer, and
support both hinge loss and mean square error (MSE) loss, as other losses like cross entropy which is
used in clear text by [48] cannot be computed over secret shared data without approximations. We
report runtime and accuracy obtained by training from scratch the smaller networks in Table 4. Note
that because of the number of epochs, the optimizer and the loss chosen, accuracy does not match
best known results. However, the training procedure is not altered and the trained model will be
strictly equivalent to its plaintext counterpart. Training cannot complete in reasonable time for larger
networks, which are anyway available pre-trained. Note that training time includes the time spent
building the preprocessing material, as it cannot be fully processed in advance and stored in RAM.
Discussion. For larger networks, we could not use batches of size 128. This is mainly due to the size
of the comparison function keys which is currently proportional to the size of the input tensor, with
a multiplication factor of nλ where n = 32 and λ = 128. Optimizing the function secret sharing
protocol to reduce those keys would lead to massive improvements in the protocol’s efficiency.
Our implementation actually has more communication than is theoretically necessary according to
Table 1, suggesting that the experimental results could be further improved. As we build on top
of PyTorch, using machines with GPUs could also potentially result in a massive speed-up, as an
important fraction of the execution time is dedicated to computation.
Last, accuracies presented in Table 3 and Table 4 do not match state-of-the-art performance for
the models and datasets considered. This is not due to internal defaults of our protocol but to the
simplified training procedure we had to use. Supporting losses such as the logistic loss, more complex
optimizers like Adam and dropout layers would be an interesting follow-up.
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A Function Secret Sharing - Comparison
One can observe the great similarity of structure of the comparison protocol given in Algorithm 3
and 4 with the equality protocol from Algorithm 1 and 2: the equality test is performed in parallel
with an additional information outi at each node, which holds a share of either 0 when the evaluator
stays on the special path or if it has already left it at a previous node, or a share of α[i] when it leaves
the special path. This means that if α[i] = 1, leaving the special path implies that x[i] = 0 and hence
x ≤ α, while if α[i] = 0, leaving implies x[i] = 1 so x > α and the output should be 0. The final
share outn+1 corresponds the previous equality test.
Note that in all these computations modulo 2n, while the bitstrings s(i)j and σ
(i)
j are in {0, 1}λ, they
are always either the same for the two players or compensated by theCW (i) andCW (i)leaf respectively,
hence they cancel. In the end, the sum [[T ]]j of the outi’s is a share of 1 either if outn+1 was a share
of 1 (i.e. x = α) or if one of the other outi was, which is possible only if α[i] = 1 and x[i] < α[i]
(i.e. x < α). Otherwise, [[Tj ]] is a share of 0 and x > α.
Let G : {0, 1}λ → {0, 1}4(λ+1) be a pseudorandom generator, where the output is seen as a pair of
pairs of elements in {0, 1}λ+1, and so ({0, 1}λ+1 × {0, 1}λ+1)× ({0, 1}λ+1 × {0, 1}λ+1).
Initialisation: Sample random α $← Z2n
Sample random s(1)j
$← {0, 1}λ and set t(1)j ← j, for j = 0, 1
1 for i = 1..n do
2 for j = 0, 1 do
3 ((sLj || tLj , || sRj || tRj ), (σLj || τLj , σRj || τRj ))← G(s(i)j )
4 if α[i] then cw(i) ← ((0λ || 0, sL0 ⊕ sL1 || 1), (σR0 ⊕ σR1 || 1, 0λ || 0))
5 else cw(i) ← ((sR0 ⊕ sR1 || 1, 0λ || 0), (0λ || 0, σL0 ⊕ σL1 || 1));
6 CW (i) ← cw(i) ⊕G(s(i)0 )⊕G(s(i)1 )
7 for j = 0, 1 do
8 statej ← G(s(i)j )⊕ (t(i)j · CW (i)) = ((statej,0, statej,1), (state′j,0, state′j,1))
9 Parse s(i+1)j || t(i+1)j = statej,α[i] and σ(i+1)j || τ (i+1)j = state′j,1−α[i]
10 CW
(i)
leaf ← (−1)τ
(i+1)
1 · [σ(i+1)1 − σ(i+1)0 + α[i]] mod 2n
11 CW
(n+1)
leaf ← (−1)t
(n+1)
1 ·
(
1− s(n+1)0 + s(n+1)1
)
mod 2n
12 return kj ← [[α]]j || s(1)j || (CW (i))i=1..n || (CW (i)leaf )i=1..n+1, for j = 0, 1
Algorithm 3: KeyGen: key generation for comparison to α
Input: (j, kj , [[y]]j) where j ∈ {0, 1} refers to the evaluator id
1 Parse kj as [[α]]j || s(1) || (CW (i))i=1..n || (CW (i)leaf )i=1..n+1
2 Publish [[α]]j + [[y]]j and get revealed x = α+ y mod 2n
3 Let t(1) ← j
4 for i = 1..n do
5 state← G(s(i))⊕ (t(i) · CW (i)) = (state0, state1)
6 Parse (s(i+1) || t(i+1), σ(i+1)j || τ (i+1)j ) = statex[i]
7 outi ← (−1)j ·
(
τ (i+1) · CW (i)leaf + σ(i+1)
)
mod 2n
8 outn+1 ← (−1)j ·
(
t(n+1) · CW (n+1)leaf + s(n+1)
)
mod 2n
9 return [[T ]]j ←
∑
i outi mod 2
n
Algorithm 4: Eval: evaluation of the function key for comparison y ≤ 0
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B Encoding precision
We have studied the impact of lowering the encoding space of the input to our function secret sharing
protocol from Z232 to Z2k with k < 32. Finding the lowest k guaranteeing good performance is
an interesting challenge as the function keys size is directly proportional to it. This has to be done
together with reducing fixed precision from 3 decimals down to 1 decimal to ensure private values
aren’t too big, which would result in higher failure rate in our private comparison protocol. We have
reported in Table 5 our findings on Network-1, which is pre-trained and then evaluated in a private
fashion.
Decimals Z212 Z216 Z220 Z224 Z228 Z232
1 - - - - - 9.5
2 69.4 96.0 97.9 98.1 98.0 98.1
3 10.4 76.2 96.9 98.1 98.2 98.1
4 9.7 14.3 83.5 97.4 98.1 98.2
Table 5: Accuracy (in %) of Network-1 given different precision and encoding spaces
What we observe is that 3 decimals of precision is the most appropriate setting to have an optimal
precision while allowing to slightly reduce the encoding space down to Z224 or Z228 . Because this is
not a massive gain and in order to keep the failure rate in comparison very low, we have kept Z232 for
all our experiments.
C Implementation details
C.1 Failure rate of FSS comparison in practical scenarios
Our comparison protocol can fail if y + α wraps around and becomes negative. We can’t act on
α because it must be completely random to act as a perfect mask and to make sure the revealed
x = y + α mod 2n does not leak any information about y, but the smaller y is, the lower the error
probability will be. [11] suggests a method which uses 2 invocations of the protocol to guarantee
perfect correctness but because it incurs an important runtime overhead, we rather show that the
failure rate of our comparison protocol is very small and is reasonable in contexts that tolerate a few
mistakes, as in machine learning. More precisely, we quantify it on real world examples, namely on
Network-2 and on the 64×64 Tiny Imagenet version of VGG16, with a fixed precision of 3 decimals,
and find respective failure rates of 1 in 4 millions comparisons and 1 in 100 millions comparisons.
Such error rates do not affect the model accuracy, as Table 3 shows.
C.2 Unrolling convolutions
Figure 3 illustrates how to transform a convolution operation into a single matrix multiplication.
Figure 3: Illustration of unrolling a convolution with kernel size k = 2 and stride s = 2.
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C.3 MaxPool and optimisation
Figure 4 illustrates how MaxPool uses ideas from matrix unrolling and argmax computation. Notations
present in the figure are consistent with the explanation of argmax using pairwise comparison in
Section 4.3. The m×m matrix is first unrolled to a m2× k2 matrix. It is then expanded on k2 layers,
each of which each shifted by a step of 1. Next, m2k2(k2− 1) pairwise comparisons are then applied
simultaneously between the first layer and the other ones, and for each xi we sum the result of its
k − 1 comparison and check if it equals k − 1. We multiply this boolean by xi and sum up along a
line (like x1 to x4 in the figure). Last, we restructure the matrix back to its initial structure.
Figure 4: Illustration of MaxPool with kernel size k = 2 and stride s = 2.
In addition, when the kernel size k is 2, rows are only of length 4 and it can be more efficient to
use a binary tree approach instead, i.e. compute the maximum of columns 0 and 1, 2 and 3 and
the max of the result: it requires log2(k
2) = 2 rounds of communication and only approximately
(k2 − 1)(m/s)2 comparisons, compared to a fixed 3 rounds and approximately k4(m/s)2.
Interestingly, average pooling can be computed locally on the shares without interaction because it
only includes mean operations, but we didn’t replace MaxPool operations with average pooling to
avoid distorting existing neural networks architecture.
C.4 BatchNorm approximation
The BatchNorm layer is the only one in our implementation which is a polynomial approximation.
Moreover, compared to [48], the approximation is significantly coarser as we don’t make any costly
initial approximation and we reduce the number of iterations of the Newton method from 4 to only
3. Typical relative error can be up to 20% but as the primary purpose of BatchNorm is to normalise
data, having rough approximations here is not an issue and doesn’t affect learning capabilities, as
our experiments show. However, it is a limitation for using pre-trained networks: we observed on
AlexNet adapted to CIFAR-10 that training the model with a standard BatchNorm and evaluating it
with our approximation resulted in poor results, so we had to train it with the approximated layer.
D Datasets and Networks Architecture
D.1 Datasets
This section is taken almost verbatim from [48].
We select 4 datasets popularly used for training image classification models: MNIST [33], CIFAR-10
[30], 64×64 Tiny Imagenet and 224×224 Tiny ImageNet [49].
MNIST MNIST [33] is a collection of handwritten digits dataset. It consists of 60,000 images in
the training set and 10,000 in the test set. Each image is a 28×28 pixel image of a handwritten digit
along wit a label between 0 and 9. We evaluate Network-1, Network-2, and the LeNet network on
this dataset.
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-10 [30] consists of 50,000 images in the training set and 10,000 in the test set.
It is composed of 10 different classes (such as airplanes, dogs, horses etc.) and there are 6,000 images
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of each class with each image consisting of a colored 32×32 image. We perform private training of
AlexNet and inference of VGG16 on this dataset.
Tiny ImageNet Tiny ImageNet [49] consists of two datasets of 100,000 training samples and
10,000 test samples with 200 different classes. The first dataset is composed of colored 64×64 images
and we use it with AlexNet and VGG16. The second is composed of colored 224×224 images and is
used with ResNet18.
D.2 Model description
We have selected 6 models for our experimentations.
Network-1 A 3-layered fully-connected network with ReLU used in SecureML [36].
Network-2 A 4-layered network selected in MiniONN [34] with 2 convolutional and 2 fully-
connected layers, which uses MaxPool in addition to ReLU activation.
LeNet This network, first proposed by LeCun et al. [32], was used in automated detection of zip
codes and digit recognition. The network contains 2 convolutional layers and 2 fully connected
layers.
AlexNet AlexNet is the famous winner of the 2012 ImageNet ILSVRC-2012 competition [31].
It has 5 convolutional layers and 3 fully connected layers and it can batch normalization layer for
stability and efficient training.
VGG16 VGG16 is the runner-up of the ILSVRC-2014 competition [46]. VGG16 has 16 layers and
has about 138M parameters.
ResNet18 ResNet18 [22] is the runner-up of the ILSVRC-2015 competition. It is a convolutional
neural network that is 18 layers deep, and has 11.7M parameters. It uses batch normalisation and
we’re the first private deep learning framework to evaluate this network.
D.3 Model Architecture
Model architectures of Network-1 and Network-2, together with LeNet, and the adaptations for
CIFAR-10 of AlexNet and VGG16 are precisely depicted in Appendix D of [48]. Note that in the
CIFAR-10 version AlexNet, authors have used the version with BatchNorm layers, and we have kept
this choice. For the 64×64 Tiny Imagenet version of AlexNet, we used the standard architecture
from PyTorch to have a pretrained network. It doesn’t have BatchNorm layers, and we have adapted
the classifier part as illustrated in Figure 5. Note also that we permute ReLU and Maxpool where
applicable like in [48], as this is strictly equivalent in terms of output for the network and reduces the
number of comparisons. More generally, we don’t proceed to any alteration of the network behaviour
except with the approximation on BatchNorm. This improves usability of our framework as it allows
to take a pre-trained neural network from a standard deep learning library like PyTorch and to encrypt
it generically with a single line of code.
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AlexNet(
(features): Sequential(
(0): Conv2d(3, 64, kernel_size=(11, 11), stride=(4, 4), padding=(2, 2))
(1): ReLU()
(2): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=3, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1)
(3): Conv2d(64, 192, kernel_size=(5, 5), stride=(1, 1), padding=(2, 2))
(4): ReLU()
(5): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=3, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1
(6): Conv2d(192, 384, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1))
(7): ReLU()
(8): Conv2d(384, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1))
(9): ReLU()
(10): Conv2d(256, 256, kernel_size=(3, 3), stride=(1, 1), padding=(1, 1))
(11): ReLU()
(12): MaxPool2d(kernel_size=3, stride=2, padding=0, dilation=1)
)
(classifier): Sequential(
(0): Linear(in_features=256, out_features=4096)
(1): ReLU(inplace=True)
(2): Linear(in_features=4096, out_features=4096)
(3): ReLU(inplace=True)
(4): Linear(in_features=4096, out_features=200)
)
)
Figure 5: Adaptation of AlexNet to the Tiny Imagenet dataset
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